BELARUS NEWS AND ANALYSIS

DATE:

26 April 2005

Rice's List

by TOL

Is the United States pursuing "regime change" in Belarus?

There is, at least according to Condoleezza Rice, one "outpost of tyranny" in the former Soviet Union. The outpost is not Turkmenistan, surely on every count the region's most repressive regime. Nor is it Uzbekistan, perpetrator of torture of a sometimes medieval nature. Instead, the country that U.S. secretary of state listed alongside Burma, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Zimbabwe was Belarus. Lukashenka may be increasingly repressive, he may (or, just possibly, may not be) responsible for the disappearances of five opponents, but to rank him as a greater tyrant than Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov and Turkmenistan's Saparmurat Niazov is clearly an injustice.

This is not to argue against Rice's position on Belarus. It is, as she said, "time for change to come" to Belarus. The Belarusan government "should know that their behavior is being watched." Pressure needs to be exerted in an effort to constrain Lukashenka's continued transformation from a soft to a hard dictatorship. But it is to argue that Rice's list of tyrannies is not an objective list.

Rice's list, which she stated in January, is probably a list of countries where the United States particularly wants to see change or believes that change can be promoted. It is, in that sense, a list with an agenda. Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, made clear what type of agenda he thinks Rice is pursuing when he said (in English) that Russia does not advocate "regime change." But it is probably not a list of planned regime changes. It would be foolish to over-estimate outsiders' ability to engineer change in Belarus (let alone Burma).

Still, it is an activist agenda for the promotion of democracy, and in a much more direct and personalized way than we saw in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. The personalization is understandable, since Lukashenka has personalized his rule in a way not seen in the other three countries. And the directness is also justified: In Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, Washington and many other Western capitals funded civil society and NGOs whose work - such as teaching people how to monitor elections or providing independent news - helped pro-democracy forces. In Belarus, the practical means of support are limited, and the verbal support needs, correspondingly, to be more overt.

But Rice was overt not just with her support, but with her advice. Despite saying that Washington does not offer advice to opposition movements, Rice said next year's presidential elections in Belarus would be an "excellent opportunity" to challenge Lukashenka.

Again, this particularly pro-active role might be justified by Belarus' special circumstances. But there is clearly more to this extra activism than the nature of Lukashenka's regime. Bush's history of contacts with Putin would suggest he would be more responsive of Russia's sensitivities to the "colored revolutions." Something has changed.

ON THE FRONT FOOT

Washington has certainly not changed into an arch-critic of Putin. Before the Bush-Putin summit in Bratislava in February, Washington signaled there would be some tough talking. In the event, the public noises from Bush - while not on a par with previous cooing - could barely be classified as tough. Rice's words in Moscow also fell short of being hard (and, shamefully, she was silent in public on Chechnya). Still, her statements about "very worrying" trends in Russian democracy and concern for the centralization of power with the lack of checks and balances, such as an independent judiciary and media, did suggest that Washington is, at the least, pressing home a few points. Even the official Russian media's attempts to downplay Rice's criticism and Lavrov's sarcastic response to Rice's diplomat-speak ("just as the United States is interested in a strong and a democratic Russia that could play its active role internationally, we are also interested that the United States should be a strong and democratic partner and country playing an active role internationally") suggest that the relationship has changed.

Rice's visit to Moscow, in combination with its headline-generating attention on Belarus, therefore indicates that Washington is being more assertive on issues Russia is sensitive about.

But to focus on the new U.S. moves is to ignore other important players and to ignore one of the key reasons for the change: the shifting the balance of power on Europe's and Russia's borders. That was shown most significantly last week when NATO said membership is open to Ukraine and outlined how it would help Ukraine carry out reforms needed before it can join the alliance. Kyiv showed just how fast it will try and carry out reforms by saying that it plans to meet membership conditions by 2008.

Less noted were the moves - or rather signals - from Russia's nearest neighbors, its "near-abroad" as it likes to call them. In one respect, Russia could take comfort from the latest meeting in Moldova of GUUAM, a security arrangement clearly intended as a counterweight to Russian power. Only four of GUUAM's five members turned up in Moldova for a meeting on 22 April. Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov stayed at home. Reports suggest Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliev hesitated before attending. But the comfort for Moscow is limited. Smaller does not mean weaker. The remaining members of GUUAM made clear who they consider to be their friends by inviting a range of prominent figures from EU member-states, a U.S. representative- and no one from Russia. In March, Ukraine and Georgia agreed GU(U)AM should become an "agent of democracy." In April, President Viktor Yushchenko said in the United States that Ukraine wants to become a regional leader. And, in April, Georgia's Mikheil Saakashvili indicated that one more country should join the list of revolutions; the clear implication was Belarus.

At the same time, Europe is becoming more critical of Russia. The criticism may not be heard from Europe's big triumvirate - France, Germany, and Britain - but in Europe's institutions there has been a sharp change. Late last year, the European Commission issued a critical review of policy towards and, during the Orange Revolution, it clearly stated the presidential elections had been flawed. The European Parliament has been hardening its stance on Belarus and, on 21 April, the head of EU foreign policy, Javier Solana, underlined the similarity of European and U.S. positions on Belarus by telling reporters that he had said "many, many, many years ago" that it was time for change in Belarus.

A GAME OF CHESS

To Lukashenka, it all seems as if there is a game of chess in progress. His analogy, made in a speech to the nation on 19 April, is fair enough.

The European Union, the United States, NATO, and the rump states of the GUUAM are acting as if in coordination, even if that is not the case. They also have some common interests: they would all subscribe to the notion that they are "agents of democracy."

To say that there is an immediate strategic goal to remove Lukashenka may, though, be wrong. That may be too unrealistic. But it serves the general purpose of maintaining the momentum for change.

In this game, Russia may not be the enemy - everyone is anxious to ensure that is not the case - but it is the opponent. Russia is not used to being on the defensive, on the back foot, in the former Soviet Union; it is more used to throwing its weight around. It is still the most powerful piece on that chessboard, but it cannot now throw its weight around in the same way when its near-abroad is also near NATO and the EU.

The West's more assertive approach underlines that. And, whatever his actual words, that message of support is the message that Bush will be sending to Moscow when he visits two countries with a particularly strong animus towards Russia, Latvia and Georgia, before and after the Victory Day parade on 9 May. That also casts an important light on recent moves: the West and its would-be members have largely defensive aims, to protect the changes achieved so far. Going on the offensive can have a defensive function.

Having lost the initiative in this balance-of-power chess game, Russia needs a new gameplan. It seems as if Russia may be realizing that. According to a 21 April report in the Christian Science Monitor, the Kremlin is now considering switching from hard-power to soft-power diplomacy in its near-abroad.

If Russia were to use soft power more, that would rate as a dramatic change - even a revolution - in its foreign policy. But, in this game of chess, one major move could change much. Look out, then, for the French referendum on the European Constitution; the uncertainty and complications caused by a No vote could cause some of the West's initiative and momentum to be lost.

Source:

http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=112&NrSection=2&NrArticle=13980


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