BELARUS NEWS AND ANALYSIS

DATE:

08/10/2007

Will Russia Deploy Nuclear Weapons in Belarus?

Richard Weitz
World Politics Review Exclusive

On Sept. 28, Belarussian Defense Minister Leonid Maltsev repeated his government's warning that U.S. plans to deploy ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in Poland and the Czech Republic could have "unpredictable consequences" for Eurasian security.

Maltsev's comments, delivered at a press conference after a meeting of the defense ministers of the member states of the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, have revived concerns that Russia might place nuclear weapons in Belarus as a countermeasure to the U.S. BMD deployments.

Last month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov insisted that his government had no plans to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus. The belated denials came a week after Alexander Surikov, the Belarus ambassador to Russia, told the media that current tensions between Moscow and the West could lead Russia and Belarus to deploy nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory to bolster their joint defenses.

Although the ambassador later claimed that he had been misquoted, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has made similar statements in the past. The fact that Russia and Belarus are both members of the CSTO, which pledges mutual assistance in case of armed attack, effectively means that Minsk, in theory, falls under Moscow's nuclear security guarantees.

As part of its proclaimed "asymmetric response" to Washington's decision to deploy BMD systems in Eastern Europe, Russia might base tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) on short-range missiles in Belarus to threaten these assets in a future conflict. Surikov's statement could easily have been a trial balloon by Moscow and Minsk to assess the international reaction to such a deployment.

Widely overlooked amidst the denials was the concurrent assertion of Russian Col. Gen. Vladimir Verhkovtsev, head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, that Moscow would not consider negotiating restrictions on Russia's sizable TNW arsenal unless France and the United Kingdom as well as the United States participate in any such discussions.

Since Russian policymakers know that achieving a consensus on such a delicate issue among Paris, London, and Washington is unlikely, they evidently are seeking to preserve a free hand in this area. No existing arms control agreement covers TNWs, which generally are defined as nuclear weapons systems having a range of less than 500 kilometers.

After the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States eliminated many of their TNWs -- and removed others from deployment on ships and with other operational combat units -- in accord with the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) of 1991-92. Since then, however, the Russian military has objected to further TNW-related arms control measures. According to multiple sources, the Russian armed forces possess thousands of TNWs, and its commanders do not appear eager to give them up.

In theory, Russian military doctrine allows Russian commanders to use these weapons for several purposes. For example, Russian strategists have discussed detonating a limited number of nuclear weapons -- perhaps just one -- to induce an adversary to end ("de-escalate" in Russian terminology) a conventional military conflict with Russia.

The selective strike would seek to exploit the inevitable "shock and awe" effect associated with nuclear use to cause the targeted decision makers to weigh the risks of nuclear devastation more heavily. This strategy exploits the fear that, after one nuclear explosion, the prospects of further detonations increase substantially. Initiating nuclear use would underscore the seriousness with which the Russian government viewed the situation and encourage the other side to de-escalate the conflict.

The most commonly discussed contingency for a "de-escalation" mission is a NATO decision to intervene against a Russian military ally (e.g., Belarus) or on behalf of a non-member country (e.g., Georgia) in a conflict with Russia. The Russian military rehearsed such a scenario in their June 1999 "Zapad-99" ("West-99") exercises. After Russian conventional forces proved unable to repulse an attack on Russia and Belarus, Russian nuclear forces conducted limited strikes against the posited enemy.

In 1993, moreover, the Russian government abandoned its declared pledge not to employ nuclear weapons first in a conflict, effectively establishing a justification in Russian doctrine for initiating nuclear use. The statement brought Russia's declared strategic posture into line with that of Britain, France, and the United States (but not China). These NATO countries have never renounced the right to resort to nuclear weapons first in an emergency.

Actually exploding a nuclear device in a conflict would prove problematic. On the one hand, it could terminate the conflict in Russia's favor. On the other, it could lead to potentially, even larger-scale, nuclear use if the other side considered the detonation a prelude to additional nuclear strikes and decided to escalate first. Russian officials would probably attempt to underscore the strike's limited nature -- by using a low-yield TNW, for instance -- to minimize the risks of further escalation.

In addition, Russian strategists have long considered using limited nuclear strikes to alter the course of a conventional conflict that Russia risked losing. The January 2000 National Security Concept, for example, implied that Russia could use TNWs to resist a conventional attack without engendering a full-scale nuclear exchange. A related function of Russian nuclear forces would be to prevent other countries from escalating a conventional conflict to a nuclear war. In such a scenario, Russia could threaten to retaliate disproportionately should an adversary employ nuclear weapons to try to alter a conventional battle in its favor. Even after one party has initiated a limited nuclear exchange, Russian commanders might attempt to control further escalation by issuing nuclear threats, showing restraint, or pursuing other "nuclear signaling."

The problem with attempting to exercise escalation control under combat conditions is that such tactics risk uncontrolled nuclear war. In theory, other possible firebreaks between non-nuclear operations and uncontrolled nuclear escalation might also exist. These could include attempts to enforce distinctions between strikes against either side's national homelands (hence the value of launching Russian attacks from Belarus against U.S. facilities in Poland) as opposed to less critical third areas, between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, or even between nuclear strikes against military and civilian targets. The most plausible line for limiting escalation, however, remains that between using and not using nuclear weapons at all.

Richard Weitz is a Hudson Institute senior fellow and a WPR contributing editor.

Source:

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1219

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