BELARUS NEWS AND ANALYSIS

DATE:

16 November 2005

The European Union's Tough Message to Belarus

On November 8, 2005, British Foreign Minister Jack Straw addressed a hard-hitting message to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko after a debate with the E.U.'s 25 foreign ministers. The E.U. threatened sanctions against Minsk under the notion that Belarus does not respect civil rights properly and is allegedly unable to hold "fair and free elections."

Then, on November 14, a U.S. official reportedly called for punitive measures against Belarus, judging that political repression in the country has reached levels that existed during Soviet rule.

The E.U.'s concerns are focused on the 2006 presidential election in Minsk. It is no secret that the United States and the European Union aren't keen of Lukashenko -- who has been in power since 1993 -- since he remains the only Eastern European leader to overtly profess a pro-Russian geopolitical preference.

Lukashenko is now set to run for a third mandate. Washington, Brussels and especially the new pro-Western E.U. members such as Poland are committed to increasing the pressure against the Belarusian government and to help opposition parties and movements with the hope of repeating the success they had in Ukraine in late 2004.

Post-Soviet Belarus and its Friction with the E.U. and N.A.T.O.

Unlike Poland, the three Baltic States, and other former communist countries, Belarus has not joined N.A.T.O. Additionally, Minsk has not shown any willingness to accept I.M.F.-inspired liberal economic reforms. Instead, Lukashenko's economic policy is founded on administrative control over prices and currency exchange rates, and aims at high growth through social spending and public intervention in the management of private enterprises.

This economic strategy has apparently brought positive results; the country's economic growth reached 6.4 percent in 2004 -- a much better result than any E.U. member could have hoped for.

However, the Belarusian inflation rate, although diminishing, is very high, and most of the country's produced goods would not be competitive in an open market. Therefore, Minsk's high economic growth depends on Russia's willingness to buy its products.

An interventionist economic model and a pro-Russian geopolitical orientation largely explain Washington's and Brussels' attitude toward the current rulers in Minsk. In fact, since Western powers tend to see the international system globally, they believe that a coherent Eastern European geopolitical region should share a common set of rules: a liberal and integrated market economy and a common security and defense policy based on N.A.T.O.

Moreover, from a geostrategic point of view, Belarus is still working as a "buffer" between N.A.T.O. and Russia. Poland would like to have the regional leadership in the post-Warsaw Pact European region extend from the Baltic to the Black Sea, further integrating its trade and economic policy with Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Belarus. In order to do so, Polish elites have backed the creation of a "Commonwealth of Independent States" formed by Poland, the Baltic States, Ukraine and Georgia, which stands as an alternative to Moscow's proposed enhanced cooperation among Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to regain political, economic and strategic influence at its periphery.

Since N.A.T.O. is actively trying to integrate Ukraine (with a N.A.T.O.-Ukraine Action Plan in place since 2002), Russian President Vladimir Putin reacted on November 9, 2005 by stating that neither Russia nor Belarus poses any threat to Ukraine, and that Ukraine's inclusion in N.A.T.O. would damage peaceful cooperation between Moscow and the West.

A global power and interest competition between the West and Moscow hence overlaps with regional competition between Poland and the Russo-Belarusian combine. Indeed, influence in Eastern Europe is once again of crucial importance.

Minsk's Increasing Dependence on Russia

The E.U. and the U.S. are increasing their pressure against Belarus because they both know the country's independence is in some aspects more apparent than real, and that some Belarusian social factions are afraid of the increasingly strong Russian role. The key is Minsk's dependence on Russia.

Without Moscow's support, Lukashenko's economic policy would encounter serious problems. For instance, in recent years Russian demand of Belarusian products has increased, and has undoubtedly helped Minsk to boost its economic growth. Russia is Belarus' first trading partner and energy supplier. Without Russian support, the Belarusian economy would quickly reach a high level of entropy since it would become a closed micro-system with unavailable energy and almost no turnover.

Such a fact increases Belarus' dependence on Russia, and paves the way to projects aimed at reunifying the two countries.

On October 10, 2005, the Interfax news agency reported that a program to introduce the Russian ruble as the Belarusian currency was approved by both the National Bank of Belarus and the Russian Central Bank. Although no date was suggested for the project to be implemented, the fact signals that Putin, Lukashenko and the relevant political factions in the two countries are pursuing plans to unify the countries.

Such plans are not to be intended as irreversible, but only as a possible integration scenario which has, however, historical grounds and geopolitical consistency. A draft constitution that calls for reunifying the two countries was recently prepared, and was scheduled to be submitted to national leaders on November 15, 2005. If approved, citizens in both countries would be called to approve it by referendum in 2006.

Paradoxically, Lukashenko's struggle to keep Belarus independent of both the E.U. and N.A.T.O. could easily end up with the demise of Minsk's national independence and the return of Russian sovereignty over the country.

Historically, Belarusian inner divisions between a Polish-oriented Catholic identity and a majority Russian-oriented Orthodox identity have surfaced more than once. Both Russian rule and the Polish-Lithuanian one have historical roots in the country. [See: "The Poland-Belarus Controversy and the Battle for Eastern Europe"]

It looks as if today's Belarus is again a stake in the conflicting relations between Poland and Russia in Eastern Europe, with Warsaw being supported by the West.

Conclusion

With the 2006 election approaching, all relevant actors in this conflict are accelerating their actions. The E.U.'s pressure, inspired and backed by Washington, is likely to give more confidence to Belarusian opposition parties. However, the E.U.'s actions are also likely to increase Putin's and Lukashenko's attempts to secure Russia's grip on Minsk.

Lukashenko, therefore, will probably be obliged to give up national sovereignty in exchange for Russian protection. Whether he does this formally or informally remains to be seen.

If the project of union with Russia progresses, then the civil movements that oppose Lukashenko's rule will probably line up against such integration attempts, and will paradoxically fight for national independence, but this time they will be backed by the West.

In the coming months, the "information war" of the two contending sides will intensify. Civil and human rights discourse will occupy center stage since the U.S. and the E.U. have singled out this issue as the one that can have the most success and serve the purpose of ousting Lukashenko.

In other words, after having triumphed in Ukraine and apparently losing in Azerbaijan, the West will try to cause a new "orange revolution" in Belarus. Lukashenko declared in February 2005 that averting such a scenario was the primary task of his administration.

With the final outcome still difficult to forecast, it is to be expected that projects to reintegrate Russia and Belarus will be heavily promoted by Moscow in the coming months. Notwithstanding Moscow's overtures to N.A.T.O. and the E.U. for enhanced security cooperation, the U.S.-E.U. combine will continue to support and to finance Belarusian opposition movements for the near-term.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Federico Bordonaro

Source:

http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=399&language_id=1